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Abstract 
Using a panel of mainly unquoted UK firms over the period 2000-09, we document a 
significant effect of changes in the interest burden from debt-servicing on firm 
survival. The effect is found to be stronger during the recent financial crisis compared 
with more tranquil periods. Furthermore, the survival chances of bank-dependent, 
younger, and non-exporting firms are most affected by changes in the interest burden, 
especially during the crisis. Our results are robust to using different estimation 
methods and different interest burden measures. They suggest that one way for 
policymakers to mitigate the effects of financial crises by limiting firm failures would 
be to prevent financing costs from rising, especially for those firms more likely to face 
liquidity constraints. 
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I. Introduction 
In August 2007, an irregular pattern of financial difficulties became a fully-fledged 
financial crisis involving most of the world’s largest banks (see Goodhart, 2008, for a 
survey). These events had a strong impact on UK financial markets in general and the 
banking sector in particular. Due to the turmoil in financial markets, at the end of the 
third quarter of 2008, 1.4 million small firms in the UK reported a severe shortage of 
credit, and some 30% of firms considered shutting down their operations altogether 
unless credit became cheaper and more easily available (Kirkup and Tyler, 2008)
1
. In 
addition, according to the Federation of Small Businesses, almost 30,000 small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) failed in 2009, while figures provided by the Office 
for National Statistics (2010) show that the corporate death rate in the UK at the end 
of 2009 was 11.8%. Paying special attention to England and Wales during the early 
1990s recession and the current financial crisis, Benito et al. (2010) confirm that 
company liquidations rise during recessionary periods. This evidence suggests the 
presence of a strong link between the shortage and high cost of credit, which typically 
characterizes recessions, and firm failures. 
The purpose of this paper is to further investigate the effects of the recent 
financial crisis on firms’ survival chances. To this end, we focus on the impact of 
changes in a firm-specific interest rate (which we call interest burden and define as 
the ratio of a firm’s total interest payments to cash flow) on business failures in the 
                                                          
1
 Similarly, according to the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC), one third of small and medium-
sized businesses in the UK faced difficulties in accessing finance during the recent crisis. Even more 
recently, access to finance remains a “major barrier” to growth for more than one in five small 
companies, with 41% of loan applications refused in the three months to February 2012 (Kuchler, 
2012). 
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UK over the period 2000-2009, and assess whether the strength of this impact 
increased during the crisis years.  
Our study is motivated by the financial accelerator-related hypothesis 
according to which deteriorations in economic conditions increase the cost of finance, 
which in turn weakens firms’ balance sheet positions, thus influencing their ability to 
borrow, and, consequently, their activities and survival chances (Bernanke et al., 
1996; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000; Vermeulen, 2002). It is well accepted 
that firms’ interest burden is inversely related to their balance sheet positions. A high 
interest burden can in fact be seen as evidence that the firm is charged a high external 
finance premium. The countercyclical movement in the premium for external funds 
amplifies borrowers’ spending and economic activity through the financial accelerator 
(Bernanke et al., 1996). Thus, the debt servicing cost is expected to affect firms’ real 
and financial decisions, as well as their survival prospects.  
The present study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, 
while previous papers have included balance sheet variables in equations modeling 
firm survival (Bunn and Redwood, 2003; Bridges and Guariglia, 2008), the literature 
is silent on the role of the firm-specific interest burden in determining firms’ chances 
of failure. Considering the evidence according to which higher levels of interest 
payments negatively affect fixed investment and employment decisions at the firm-
level (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito, 2005; and Benito and Young, 2007), we 
move this literature forward by investigating, for the first time, the links between 
firms’ interest burden and their survival chances. As firms’ real activities are 
adversely affected by a rise in borrowing costs, we expect higher levels of the interest 
burden to be associated with lower chances of firm survival. Moreover, we 
differentiate the effects of changes in the interest burden on firm survival over a 
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tranquil period (2000-2006) and the financial crisis period (2007-2009), focusing on 
the UK, which was particularly affected by the crisis (Rose and Spiegel, 2011). This 
may help us understand the channels through which the financial crisis led to the 
failure of several UK firms, and in particular several small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).  
Our second contribution is that contrary to most of the literature, which looked 
at the effects of the financial crisis focusing on listed companies (e.g. Kahle and 
Stultz, 2013; Santos, 2013), we focus on a large panel of mainly unlisted firms. As 
unlisted companies are typically younger and smaller than their listed counterparts, 
they are more likely to face problems of asymmetric information, and are hence more 
likely to be affected by liquidity constraints (Hughes, 1994). Focusing on unlisted 
companies allows us therefore to provide a sharper analysis of the effects of the recent 
financial crisis on corporate behavior than previously done in the literature.  
In addition, the size of our panel enables us to take into account three 
dimensions of firm heterogeneity (bank dependency, age, and export status), aimed at 
measuring the degree of financing constraints faced by firms. This is an important 
contribution in the light of the fact that the firms in our sample are heterogeneous and 
unlikely to be affected by changes in the interest burden in the same way. Our first 
dimension of firm heterogeneity is based on the extent to which firms can be 
considered as bank-dependent. It is now well documented that since the onset of the 
crisis, banks have incurred severe losses, which have led them to significantly 
increase the cost of loans directed towards bank-dependent firms (Santos, 2013). Also 
considering that the pool of funds that banks could lend was reduced during the crisis 
(Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), this suggests that bank-dependent firms are likely to 
have suffered more from the effects of the crisis than their less bank-dependent 
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counterparts. Next, we differentiate old from young firms, whereby the latter are 
likely to face a higher degree of information asymmetries due to the lack of track 
record reputation, and hence a higher degree of financing constraints (Hadlock and 
Pierce, 2010). Finally, we distinguish exporters from non-exporters, whereby the 
former are less likely to face financing constraints (Greenaway et al., 2007). We 
expect bank-dependent, younger, and non-exporting firms’ failure probabilities to be 
most affected by changes in the interest burden, especially during the crisis years. 
We find that the interest burden has a significant effect on firm survival, and 
that this effect is stronger during the recent financial crisis compared with more 
tranquil periods. Furthermore, the survival chances of bank-dependent, younger, and 
non-exporting firms are most affected by changes in the interest burden, especially 
during the crisis. Our results are robust to using different estimation methods and 
different interest burden measures.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides some 
economic background for our research. In section III, we illustrate our empirical 
specifications and the main hypotheses that we test. Section IV describes our data and 
presents some summary statistics. Section V illustrates our main empirical results. 
Section VI provides some robustness tests, and Section VII concludes and discusses 
some policy implications. 
 
II. Economic background 
In a world characterized by asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, 
there exists a wedge between the cost of funds generated externally (by issuing debt 
or equity) and internally (by retained earnings, Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke 
et al., 1996). As general interest rates (and hence the interest burden) rise, firms’ net 
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worth is reduced
2
, and their balance sheet situation worsens. Due to moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems, this reduces lending to firms through the balance sheet 
channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). This happens because banks reduce their actual 
lending to firms and/or because they charge rates so high that the borrowers can no 
longer afford to take up the loans. The upshot is that due to this reduced access to 
external finance, firms’ investment and other corporate activities decline, which in the 
extreme, may lead to a rising probability of bankruptcy (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999). 
Small and young firms, and more in general, firms more likely to suffer from 
asymmetric information problems and financing constraints, will be most affected by 
this channel, as banks are always more reluctant to lend to them, and because they 
typically suffer from a higher wedge between the cost of external and internal funds.  
This problem is likely to be exacerbated during periods of recession, which are 
characterized by sustained increases in the cost of external finance, independent on 
any monetary policy shift, through the financial accelerator (Bernanke et al., 1996). 
As the quality of borrowers deteriorates, which is typical during recessionary periods, 
lenders require in fact a higher spread to compensate them for the increased risk of 
lending (Santos and Winton, 2008). Being typically more risky, financially 
constrained firms are most likely to be charged even higher interest rates. This 
negatively affects their net worth, and provokes, in turn, a further reduction in their 
ability to borrow, further reducing their spending, investment, and production, raising 
their probability of bankruptcy, and magnifying the effects of the recession. Perez-
Quiros and Timmermann (2000) propose a similar argument and further claim that 
because small firms, which are typically considered as financially constrained, are 
                                                          
2
 Net worth comprises the firm’s liquid assets and marketable securities. This includes cash flow. A rise 
in interest rates lowers cash flow, which, in turn, leads to a lower net worth. 
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likely to be bank-dependent, they are also likely to be affected by the fact that under 
tighter credit conditions, the pool of funds that banks can lend out is reduced.  
The international evidence on the recent financial crisis is indicative of a rise 
in the cost of credit and of a drop in firms’ access to external finance. For instance, 
recent evidence shows that banks, and especially those which incurred the largest 
losses in connection with the subprime meltdown, monitored their borrowers more 
closely, increased the cost of loans directed towards firms, and, more in general, 
became more cautious in their lending practices (Santos, 2013). Bank-dependent 
borrowers suffered more from this problem than borrowers with access to bond 
markets (Santos, 2013). Along similar lines, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) 
document a strong reduction in the supply of bank credit during the financial crisis, 
and Almeida et al. (2013) also note a significant drop in firms’ access to external 
financing during the crisis, and claim this was a major determinant of firms’ survival.  
Focusing on the UK, the Bank of England reports a reduction of loans to 
private non-financial corporations (PNFCs) from UK monetary financial institutions 
during the financial crisis. Specifically, loans to PNFCs fell by £3.6 bn from 2007 to 
2008, and by another £3.9 bn in 2009
3
. In addition, Bell and Young (2010) argue that 
the cost of credit rose sharply during the financial crisis, especially for SMEs. Yet, to 
the best of our knowledge, the extent to which this increase in the cost of credit has 
affected firms’ survival chances in the UK context has not been investigated. Our 
paper fills this gap in the literature. 
 
III. Empirical implementation 
Baseline specification 
                                                          
3
 See the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database (www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb). 
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In order to establish the extent to which financial pressure from debt-servicing costs 
affects firms’ survival prospects, we model the determinants of firm survival and 
check whether the interest burden significantly affects it. In line with Bunn and 
Redwood (2003), Bridges and Guariglia (2008), and Helmers and Rogers (2010, 
2011), we define a firm as failed in a given year when its status is that of receivership, 
liquidation, or dissolved.  
Following recent literature on firm survival (Bandick and Görg and, 2010; 
Tsoukas, 2011; and Görg and Spaliara, 2014), our empirical models are estimated 
using the complementary log-log (cloglog) model, which is equivalent to the discrete 
time version of the Cox proportional hazard model
4
. The baseline proportional hazard 
is formulated as: 
            ( , ) 1 exp[ exp( )]jh j X X       (1)         
where h( j, X) is the interval hazard for the period between the beginning and the end 
of the thj year after the first appearance of the firm. The   parameters show the 
effects of the explanatory variables X on the hazard rate, and   captures period-
specific effects on the hazard. To test whether firm exit is affected by the firm-specific 
interest rate, we include the interest burden (IB) among the explanatory variables. 
       The effects of changes in firm-specific interest payments on various aspects of 
firm behavior have been analyzed in previous literature. For instance, focusing on the 
UK, Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) find that, controlling for expected wages and 
demand, an increase in the borrowing ratio (which they define as the ratio of interest 
payments to cash flow) has a large negative effect on firm-level employment. Benito 
(2005) shows that the same borrowing ratio is negatively related to firm-level 
                                                          
4
 Our results were robust to using a pooled and random-effects probit model, as well as a linear 
probability model. The results, which are available upon request, remained largely unchanged.  
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inventory investment in both the UK and Spain; and Benito and Young (2007), that it 
also affects fixed investment, new equity issues, and dividend payments. Mojon et al. 
(2002) show that the mean interest on financial debt paid by small firms in the Euro 
area is on average higher than that paid by larger firms, and strongly affects firms’ 
fixed investment. Benito and Whitley (2003) provide evidence of a significant inverse 
relationship between the financial health of UK firms and the firm-specific implicit 
interest rate, which they define as the ratio of interest payments to the moving average 
of three years of total debt centred at the current year. Finally, recent evidence by 
Spaliara (2009) shows that the capital-labor ratio of financially constrained UK firms 
is more sensitive to the interest burden compared to that of their unconstrained 
counterparts.  
         Moving this literature forward, we employ the interest burden to capture, for the 
first time, the effects of a change in debt-servicing costs on firm survival. In the spirit 
of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), Benito (2005), and Benito and Young (2007), we 
measure the interest burden using the ratio of interest payments to cash flow. 
Increases in interest payments should negatively affect firms’ financial position, 
therefore raising the interest burden. In turn, we expect higher levels of the interest 
burden to be associated with lower chances of firm survival.   
In addition to the interest burden, the vector X comprises three additional 
financial variables aimed at capturing the effects of financial health on the likelihood 
of survival. These include solvency (SOLV), measured as the ratio of shareholders’ 
funds to total assets; the leverage ratio (LEV), defined as the ratio of the firm’s current 
liabilities to total assets; and the profitability ratio (PROF), defined as the ratio of 
10 
 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets
5
. The vecor X also includes the 
following additional firm-specific characteristics, which, according to the literature, 
affect firm survival: size (SIZE), measured as the logarithm of total real assets; age 
(AGE), defined as the difference between the present year and the firm’s date of 
incorporation; and the dummy variable GROUP, which takes value one if the firm is 
part of a group, and zero otherwise. We also control for macroeconomic conditions by 
including the real effective exchange rate (EXCHANGE), calculated as the geometric 
weighted average of bilateral effective exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer 
prices. Lastly, X contains a set of industry and time dummies that control respectively 
for industry and business cycle effects
6
.
  
 
Accounting for differences between crisis and non-crisis periods 
In order to investigate the extent to which, controlling for other factors, firm survival 
differs in crisis years compared to more tranquil periods, we include in vector X of 
Equation (1) a financial crisis dummy (CRISIS), which takes value one over the 
period 2007-09, and zero otherwise
7
. The coefficient associated with the CRISIS 
dummy is aimed at capturing the marginal effect of the crisis on firm survival, holding 
everything else equal.  
We next investigate whether in addition to having a direct effect on firms’ 
chances of survival, the financial crisis may also have an indirect impact by 
magnifying the effect of firms’ interest burden on survival. To this end, we examine 
                                                          
5
 Contemporaneous values of the interest burden and our financial variables are included in our firm 
survival equation. Our results were robust to lagging these variables once to mitigate potential 
endogeneity concerns. 
6
 Section 1 in the online Appendix provides a thorough discussion of the effects that each of these 
variables is likely to have on firms’ survival chances, in the light of the literature. 
7
 Our results were robust to defining the dummy CRISIS equal to one in 2008-09, and 0 otherwise.  
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whether the sensitivity of firms’ survival prospects to changes in the interest burden 
differs between crisis and tranquil periods. Specifically, we include in the vector X of 
Equation (1) an interaction between the interest burden (IB) and the CRISIS dummy, 
and an interaction between the interest burden (IB) and the (1-CRISIS) dummy. 
Comparing the coefficients on these two interaction terms enables us to assess the 
extent to which changes in the interest burden have a different effect on firms’ 
survival during tranquil and crisis periods. This test is motivated by the financial 
accelerator-related hypothesis according to which a deterioration of economic 
conditions negatively affects the health of firms’ balance sheets. In these 
circumstances, firms facing increased debt-servicing costs might face a higher 
probability of failure during the crisis than outside. We therefore expect the effects of 
changes in the interest burden on firms’ chances of failure to be stronger during the 
crisis. 
 
Accounting for firm heterogeneity 
We next explore the extent to which an increase in the interest burden may have a 
different impact on the survival chances of firms characterized by different degrees of 
financing constraints, taking into account the effect of the financial crisis. This test is 
motivated by Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), who analyze the effects of changes in 
firms’ borrowing ratio on their employment decisions, differentiating firms on the 
basis of the degree of financial pressure they face
8
.  
                                                          
8
 Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) identify stronger effects of shifts in the borrowing ratio for companies 
which are under greater long-term financial pressure. They proxy long-term financial pressure using 
firm size, the dividend payout ratio, and the debt to capital ratio. 
12 
 
Following the literature (Kashyap et al., 1993; Huang, 2003; Guariglia and 
Mateut, 2006), we use bank dependency as our first indicator of the degree of 
financing constraints faced by firms. This can be justified in the light of the fact that it 
is generally risky and low credit firms, which rely on bank finance (Huang, 2003).  As 
in Guariglia and Mateut (2006), we define bank-dependent firms in two ways: the first 
is based on their ratio of short–term debt to the sum of short-term debt and trade credit 
(mix1), and the second on their ratio of short-term debt to total current liabilities 
(mix2). Specifically, we create a dummy variable BankDep1 (BankDep2) which is 
equal to one for firm i in year t if firm i’s  mix1 (mix2) falls in the top 50% of  the 
distribution of the mix1s (mix2s) of all firms operating in the same industry as firm i 
in year t, and zero otherwise.  As short-term debt is predominately made up of bank 
finance, the BankDep1 and BankDep2 dummies are good proxies of bank 
dependency.  
We next partition our sample into young and old firms using the age of 
incorporation as a sorting device. We define a firm as young (old) in a given year if its 
age falls in the bottom (top) 50% of the age distribution of all firms operating in the 
same industry as this firm in that year, and 0 otherwise. Spaliara (2009) and Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010)  note that young firms are less known and have not established a 
track record in the market. Consequently, they are more likely to be associated with a 
higher degree of informational asymmetry, and are less likely to have access to capital 
markets.  
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Finally, we differentiate firms between exporters and non-exporters, whereby 
the latter are firms that never exported throughout the sample period. It has been 
found that exporters are generally financially healthier than non-exporters 
(Greenaway et al., 2007; Guariglia and Mateut, 2010). This could be explained by 
three important considerations. First, exporters have access to both domestic and 
international financial markets, which enables them to diversify their sources of 
financing and the associated risks. Second, they are less tied to the domestic cycle, 
and less subject to those financial constraints induced by tight monetary policy and 
recessions at home.
9
 They therefore benefit from a more stable cash flow, which, 
providing greater assurance to lenders that the firm will be able to service its 
obligation, relaxes their liquidity constraints (Guariglia and Mateut, 2010). Finally, 
given the presence of sunk costs that need to be met when entering foreign markets 
for the first time (Roberts and Tybout, 1997), being an exporter also provides a signal 
that the firm is sufficiently productive to generate enough profits in foreign markets to 
recover the sunk costs. This increases the likelihood that the firm will be able to 
service its external debt, and further relaxes the liquidity constraints that it faces. 
To take firm heterogeneity into account, we estimate the following 
specification: 
1 2
3 4 5
7 8 9 10 11
0
6
12
* * * *(1 )
*(1 )* *(1 )
( , ) 1
*(1 )
[ (
)]j
IB CONS CRISIS IB CONS CRISIS
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h j X exp exp
LEVERAGE
PROFIT SIZ
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  
  
      

   
 
 
 
    
 

 
(2) 
where CONS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is (in turn) bank-dependent, 
young, or a non-exporter, and 0 otherwise. We expect the effect of a rise in the cost of 
                                                          
9
 This argument relies on the assumption that business cycles are not perfectly coordinated across 
countries. 
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finance on the survival of both constrained and unconstrained firms to be stronger 
during the financial crisis, as financial intermediaries became reluctant to lend money 
to these firms (Parker and Eaglesham, 2008; Bank of England, 2009; Fraser, 2009) 
and/or charged them higher interest rates (Bell and Young, 2010; Santos, 2013), 
further jeopardizing their survival chances (i.e. we expect to observe that 1> 2 and 
that 3>4). Moreover, we expect an increase in IB to have a more severe impact on 
the survival of more bank-dependent firms compared to their less bank-dependent 
counterparts. The same is true for young versus old firms, as well as non-exporters 
versus exporters (i.e. we expect to observe that 1> 3 and that 2>4).  
 
IV. Data and summary statistics 
Data 
Our data set is drawn from the annual accounting reports taken from the Financial 
Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database, published by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing (BvDEP). The full version of the FAME database provides information on 
2.8 million companies (1.9 million of which are in a detailed format) over the period 
2000–200910.  
To construct our data set, we use three different versions of FAME. In 
particular, we employ FAME October 2010, FAME October 2008, and FAME 
February 2005. In line with Helmers et al. (2011) and Javorcik and Li (2013), we take 
this approach to address potential attrition bias since FAME keeps only firms that 
have not been inactive for more than four years. Therefore, if only the 2010 version of 
                                                          
10
 It is noteworthy that three types of access to the FAME database are available. Type C gives access 
to all firms in the database, while types B and A exclude in turn subsets of the smallest companies. Our 
dataset is based on type A access. In addition, a maximum of ten years of complete data history can be 
downloaded at once. We have only selected firms that have unconsolidated accounts: this ensures that 
the majority of the firms in our dataset are relatively small. Moreover, it avoids the double counting of 
firms belonging to groups, which would be included in the dataset if firms with consolidated accounts 
were also part of it. 
15 
 
FAME were used, we would miss firms that exited by 2006 or possibly 2005. Thus, 
our dataset is able to track firm exits up to the earlier part of the sample period.  
To accurately construct our dependent variable we also take into account that 
some firms may exit due to mergers and acquisitions. Following Helmers and Rogers 
(2010) and Görg and Spaliara (2014), we use Bureau Van Dijk’s ZEPHYR database, 
which contains information on mergers and acquisitions, to identify and drop those 
firms that are mistakenly coded as “failed” in our data. This ensures that our indicator 
variable has been accurately constructed to capture firms that failed and did not exit 
due to mergers and acquisitions.  
Following normal selection criteria used in the literature, we drop observations 
with negative sales, as well as observations with negative total assets. Firms that do 
not have complete records on our main regression variables are also dropped. To 
control for the potential influence of outliers, we exclude observations in the 1% tails 
for each of our regression variables. Our final panel, which is unbalanced, includes 
20,238 firms and 136,982 observations
11
. This represents approximately 20% of the 
UK manufacturing sector excluding sole proprietorships and partnerships with self-
employed owner-manager(s)
12
. The vast majority of firms included in this dataset are 
not traded on the stock market. This is an appealing characteristic since unquoted 
firms are more likely to be associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry 
and therefore more likely to face an increased probability of failure, especially during 
extreme economic conditions (Hughes, 1994)
13
.  
                                                          
11
 See Section 2 of the online Appendix for information about the structure of our panel (Table A1) and 
for precise definitions of all the variables used. Also see Sections 3 and 4 of the online Appendix for a 
discussion on the representativeness of our sample and on whether our sample selection criteria 
generate bias. 
12
 The data are taken from the Department of Business and Innovations Skills, Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprise Statistics for the UK and Regions (http://stats.bis.gov.uk/ed/sme). 
13
 Also see Bunn and Redwood (2003), Bridges and Guariglia (2008), Helmers and Rogers (2010, 
2011), and Görg and Spaliara (2014), who used the FAME dataset to study business failures in the UK.   
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Summary statistics 
Tables 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in our empirical models 
for the entire sample. We distinguish between failed and surviving firms (columns 2 
and 3); and crisis and tranquil periods (columns 5 and 6). In columns 4 and 7 we 
report p-values of a test for the equality of means. We can see that the average failure 
rate in our sample is 14.3%, which is much higher compared with previous UK 
studies (Bunn and Redwood, 2003 and Bridges and Guariglia, 2008). The difference 
between our figures and theirs is probably due to the fact that their sample covers a 
much earlier time period (up to 2003). It is therefore possible that failure rates have 
increased over the most recent years. Our figures are consistent with the Structural 
Business Statistics reported by Eurostat, according to which the average failure rate 
between 2000 and 2009 in the manufacturing sector is approximately 10%. When 
comparing failing and surviving firms (columns 2 and 3), we note that the former are 
charged a significantly higher interest for servicing short-term debt. Moreover, 
surviving firms are less indebted, more profitable, and less solvent than their failed 
counterparts. These findings are in line with Bunn and Redwood (2003), Bridges and 
Guariglia, (2008), and Görg and Spaliara (2014). Furthermore, survivors are larger, 
older, and more likely to be part of a group. These differences between sub-samples 
are statistically significant in all cases (column 4). 
When comparing the 2007-09 financial crisis period with the earlier years of 
our sample (columns 5 and 6), we observe that the average failure rate is higher 
during the crisis. Yet, although the difference in failure rates during and outside the 
crisis is statistically significant at the 1% level (column 7), it is actually not very large. 
Three factors can explain the relatively low number of insolvencies over the crisis 
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period. First, the relatively healthy position of the corporate sector prior to the crisis 
may have played a role. Second, the forbearance by banks on existing loans, together 
with the low level of the Bank Rate may have enabled businesses to continue trading 
despite the lower demand and related losses. Third, the relatively few company 
liquidations may be explained by effects of monetary and fiscal policies implemented 
during the financial crisis period (see Benito el al., 2010, and Bank of England, 2012). 
It should be noted, however, that the overall low number of UK insolvencies during 
the 2007-2009 period hides the fact that survival was a major problem for UK SMEs. 
 Moving to the interest burden, we note that this variable takes the value of 
37.5% during the crisis, while it equals 35.8% during tranquil periods. Once again, 
this difference is statistically significant. It is also noteworthy that the average interest 
burden in our sample is higher than that reported by Benito (2005) and Benito and 
Young (2007). This can be explained considering that, contrary to ours, their study 
focuses on UK listed companies, which are likely to be less indebted than their 
unlisted counterparts. This higher interest burden during the crisis is driven by an 
increase in interest payments, rather than by a decline in cash flow. Specifically, 
according to our data, average interest payments increased by 72% during the crisis 
period. The difference in the mean interest payment figures across the crisis and 
preceding periods is statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, 
average cash flow actually increased by 5% in the crisis period, and the difference in 
mean cash flow during and before the crisis is only marginally significant
14
. This 
confirms that during the financial crisis, firms faced an increase in the debt-servicing 
cost. Specifically, the higher interest burden observed in the period 2007-2009 is 
mainly due to the increase in the spread over the reference rate at which loans were 
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 These numbers are not reported in the Table for brevity. 
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offered. As explained in Bank of England (2009), “increases in spreads are likely to 
reflect in part a re-pricing due to increased perceptions of credit risk, following a 
prolonged period earlier in the decade where corporate credit risks were underpriced” 
(pp. 6-7).
15
  
In summary, these preliminary statistics suggest that firms’ failure rates may 
be related to the interest burden, financial health, and the recent financial crisis. In the 
sections that follow, we provide a formal econometric analysis on the links between 
these variables
16
.  
 
V. Empirical results 
Firm survival, financial crisis, and the role of interest burden 
In this section we shed light on the role played by changes in the interest burden on 
firms’ survival before and during the recent financial crisis. A few papers have 
considered the impact of financial pressure on firms’ real decisions (Nickell and 
Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito, 2005; and Benito and Young, 2007). In particular, they have 
documented significant effects of debt-servicing costs on investment expenditures, 
dividend payments, inventory investment, and employment. Given that debt-servicing 
costs increased during the recent crisis as evidenced by Bell and Young (2010), we 
take one step further and evaluate the effects of changes in the interest burden on firm 
survival, and assess whether these effects were magnified during the financial crisis. 
Table 2 presents the estimates of our survival equations. In column 1, the interest 
burden is included in the estimating equation along with a number of firm-specific 
and other control variables. The coefficient associated with the interest burden enables 
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 A similar point with reference to UK loan spreads is also made by Bell and Young (2010). Also see 
Fraser (2009) for an illustration of the extent to which the cost of loans to SMEs increased during the 
recent financial crisis.  
16
 Additional summary statistics are reported in Section 5 of the online Appendix. 
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us to assess the consequences of a ceteris paribus increase in interest burden on the 
probability of firm exit. Column 2 includes both the interest burden and the crisis 
dummy, and column 3 includes the crisis dummy, as well as the indirect effect of the 
crisis through interactions with the interest burden.  
Starting with column 1, we observe that the firm-specific interest burden 
exerts a positive and highly significant effect on firm failure. Considering that the 
predicted exit probability evaluated at the mean of the independent variables is 3.5 %, 
the coefficient on IB suggests that a one percent increase in the interest burden is 
associated with a rise in the predicted exit probability of around [exp(0.614)-1]*3.5= 
2.96 percentage points. Consistent with our expectations, increases in the debt-
servicing costs affect firms’ survival prospects negatively. This is in line with other 
studies which find a negative effect of debt-servicing costs on investment 
expenditures, dividend payments, inventory investment, and employment (Nickell and 
Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito, 2005, and Benito and Young, 2007)
17,18
. 
Column 2 includes the crisis dummy and is aimed at evaluating the marginal 
effect of the crisis on firm survival, holding everything else equal. The crisis dummy 
attracts a positive coefficient, which can be explained considering that during 
downturns, economic activity faces a general slowdown which is likely to affect firm 
survival. The coefficients on the interest burden, control, and financial variables are 
similar to those reported in column 1.  
                                                          
17
 Even though our equation controls for a range of variables that typically affect corporate death rates, 
one could argue that a higher interest burden and firm exit may be driven by the same unobservable 
variables and therefore may seem to occur at the same time, without a causal link running from the 
former to the latter. In order to convince readers that this is not the case, we show that our results are 
robust to lagging the interest burden, using Instrumental Variable (IV) pooled linear and probit models, 
a simple fixed-effects model, a conditional Logit fixed-effects model, an IV fixed-effects model, and a 
two stage least squares model estimated in first-differences. The results of these approaches are 
reported and discussed in Section 7 of the online Appendix.   
18
 Other coefficients in the Table are discussed in Section 6 of the online Appendix. 
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When we include the interactions between the interest burden and the 
crisis/non-crisis dummies in column 3, we find a positive and highly significant effect 
of the firm-specific interest rate on the likelihood of exit both in and out of the crisis. 
However, the results suggest that firms respond differently to the financial pressure of 
servicing debt throughout the cycle: increases in interest payments have a greater 
impact on the hazard of failure during the crisis than outside. The difference in this 
effect across the two time periods is economically important: a one percent increase in 
the interest burden raises in fact the predicted exit probability by 9.68% over the 
period 2007-2009, but only by 2.18% during tranquil periods. The p-value for the 
equality of the coefficients indicates a statistically significant difference between the 
two coefficients. It is also interesting to notice that once the interaction terms are 
added to the equation, the CRISIS dummy loses its significance. This suggests that the 
crisis affected firm survival mainly indirectly, by magnifying the effect of changes in 
the interest burden. This can be explained in the light of the financial accelerator 
hypothesis, according to which the effects of changes in firms’ balance sheet positions 
on their activities, and hence their survival, are magnified during recessionary periods 
(Bernanke et al., 1996; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000). Another explanation 
for our findings could be that, during the crisis, banks became less tolerant of 
companies facing a high interest burden, which may reflect a change in their risk 
appetite. In other words, because they were concerned about their own balance sheets 
due to the increased risk of non-performing loans and write-offs, banks monitored 
their borrowers more closely and became generally more cautious in their lending 
practices (Kara et al., 2011). In line with this argument, Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010), Bell and Young (2010), and Almeida et al. (2013) note a significant reduction 
in the supply of bank credit in both the US and the UK during the crisis. 
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 In a nutshell, our results so far suggest that higher levels of the interest burden 
are likely to have increased firms’ chances of failure during the recent financial crisis. 
To provide further support to this conclusion, we have partitioned our sample into 
firm-years that experienced a rise in their interest burden, and firm-years whose 
interest burden either stayed constant or declined. Focusing on the entire sample, the 
former experienced an average failure rate of 16.11%, while the average failure rate of 
the latter was only 5.27%. The difference between the two rates is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This confirms that an increasing interest burden is 
generally associated with a higher failure rate. In addition, as shown in Figure A12 in 
Section 8 of the online Appendix, only those firm-years that experienced a rise in the 
interest burden show a significant rise in their failure rates over the crisis period. 
Other observations actually show a declining failure rate
19
. This confirms that rising 
interest payments are likely to have been one of the driving factors explaining the 
high exit of firms during the recent financial crisis. 
 
Differentiating firms according to their degree of bank dependency, age, and 
exporting activity 
In Table 3, we investigate whether changes in interest payment obligations have a 
differential impact on the hazard of failure of firms more and less likely to face 
financing constraints, in and out of the crisis. We expect more bank-dependent firms 
to face a higher sensitivity of failure to changes in the interest burden. The same 
argument holds for young and non-exporting firms, which are typically more 
financially constrained than their older and exporting counterparts.  
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 In unreported statistics, we show that it is mainly bank-dependent firms and non-exporters who 
suffered a significant increase in the interest burden over the crisis period. 
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We label bank-dependent (columns 1 and 2), young (column 3), and non-
exporting firms (column 4) as “constrained”. The interest burden is interacted with 
both the constrained/unconstrained dummies and the crisis/non-crisis dummies to 
gauge the extent to which the effects of debt-servicing cost on the likelihood of failure 
differ for more and less-financially constrained firms throughout the business cycle. 
The emphasis is put on the differential behavior of firms more likely to face financial 
constraints during and outside the crisis, but we also check for differences in the 
behavior of unconstrained firms over the two periods. To ensure that our results are 
robust, we carry out our estimations using two different classification criteria for bank 
dependency, based on firms’ short-term debt to the sum of short-term debt and trade 
credit (BankDep1, column 1) and
 
short-term debt to total current liabilities 
(BankDep2, column 2).  
Focusing on rows 1 and 2 of Table 3, we observe that for bank-dependent, 
young, and non-exporting firms, the interest burden exhibits a much larger coefficient 
during the crisis than outside. A test for the equality of the coefficients is reported at 
the foot of the Table. It shows that the differences in the coefficients on the interest 
burden for constrained firms during and outside the crisis are statistically significant. 
 
We next compare rows 3 and 4 and observe that the estimated coefficients on 
the interest burden are positive and significant for unconstrained firms both in and out 
of the crisis, and, once again, generally higher in the crisis. The p-values for the test of 
the differences in these coefficients show that they are once again statistically 
significant.    
Next, we compare the coefficients on the interest burden at constrained and 
unconstrained firms during the crisis (rows 1 and 3). We observe that the sensitivity of 
the firms’ chances of survival to changes in the interest burden is always higher for 
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the former. The p-values reported at the foot of the Table reveal that in two out of four 
cases, during the crisis, the coefficients on the interest burden for constrained firms 
are significantly different from those of unconstrained firms
20
.   
             Access to capital markets is likely to be prohibitively expensive for 
financially constrained firms, which are more likely to depend on banks for external 
finance. During the financial crisis, the strong reliance of these firms on bank debt had 
disastrous effects on their viability given the shortage of bank credit available in the 
market. It is in fact documented that during the crisis, most banks tightened lending 
standards. As a consequence of this, those bank-dependent financially constrained 
firms had to scale back their investment projects and restrain their activities. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that following a rise in their debt obligations, more-
bank-dependent, young and non-exporting firms were more likely to fail during the 
crisis.   
The last pair of interactions to be compared are those in rows 2 and 4. Results 
for both constrained and unconstrained firms during tranquil periods are mixed. When 
bank dependency is used as a measure of constraints, the effect of changes in the 
interest burden on firm chances of survival is higher for more bank-dependent firms. 
Yet, when age and exporting are employed as sorting devices, the effect is higher for 
older and equal for exporting firms. In these cases, however, the differences in the 
relevant coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
In summary, the greater sensitivities of firm survival to changes in the interest 
burden documented for more-bank-dependent, young, and non-exporting firms during 
the crisis than outside confirms that rising interest payments are likely to have been 
                                                          
20
 This happens when we use the bank dependency criteria to differentiate firms into more and less 
likely to face financing constraints, and may be indicative of the importance of being bank-dependent 
during the crisis. 
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one of the driving factors explaining the high exit of financially constrained firms 
during the crisis
21
.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
The literature on business failures has mainly considered the effects of direct 
measures of firms’ balance sheet health on firms’ survival chances. In this paper we 
take a different angle by examining, for the first time, the role of firm-specific interest 
payments, measured by the interest burden, in determining firm survival. Our results, 
based on firm-level data for the UK over the period 2000 to 2009, suggest that there is 
a strong link between debt-servicing costs and firm survival. This link is particularly 
strong during the 2007-09 financial crisis, during which firms became more likely to 
fail as a consequence of an increase in their interest burden. When we differentiate 
firms into more and less likely to face financing constraints, we find that survival 
chances at bank-dependent, younger, and non-exporting firms are the most severely 
affected by changes in interest payments, especially during the crisis. Our results are 
robust to using different estimation methods and different interest burden measures. 
The increased cost of servicing debt which triggered the rise in the interest 
burden over the period 2007 to 2009 may have been a driving factor for many of the 
corporate failures which accompanied the crisis. This can be explained considering 
that banks became less tolerant of companies facing a high interest burden during the 
crisis, which may reflect a change in their risk appetite. In other words, because 
during economic slowdowns, banks face a higher risk of non-performing loans and 
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 As our sample separation criteria (with the exception of age) may be endogenous, we tested whether 
our results were robust to using pre-sample bank dependency and export status to partition our sample. 
These results, which are not reported for brevity but available upon request, were very similar to those 
reported in Table 3. Our results were also robust to controlling for the possible endogeneity of our 
financial variables by using instrumental variables (IV) probit models, and to using an alternative 
measure of the interest burden, namely the ratio of interest payments to total debt. These robustness 
tests are discussed respectively in Sections 9 and 10 of the online Appendix. 
25 
 
write-offs, they tend to monitor their borrowers more closely and are generally more 
cautious in their lending practices (Kara et al., 2011). The reduction in the supply of 
bank loans directed towards firms with a high interest burden is likely to have 
prevented these firms from investing, and ultimately to have hastened their exit from 
the market.  
The resulting policy implications are important, in particular, but not only, in 
the current economic climate. We suggest that policymakers should prevent financing 
costs from rising during economic downturns. This implication is reflected in the 
extraordinary measures the Bank of England has taken during the financial crisis 
period. Specifically, the fact that the Bank of England’s own policy rate was reduced 
to a historic low of 0.5% is likely to have significantly contributed to the lower 
corporate failure rates. In addition, several other policies aimed at making low cost 
credit readily available to financially constrained firms, such as the £190 billion 
Project Merlin, the National Loan  Guarantee Scheme, the Funding for Lending 
Scheme (FLS), and the Discount Window Facility (DWF) are also likely to have 
helped  stabilise the UK market and improve firms’ performance and survival 
prospects
22
.  
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TABLE 1: Summary statistics 
 Total 
Sample 
(1) 
Fail=1 
(2) 
Fail=0 
(3) 
Diff. 
(4) 
Crisis=1 
(5) 
Crisis=0 
(6) 
Diff. 
(7) 
Fail 0.143 1.00 0.000 - 0.148 0.141 0.002 
 (0.35) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.35) (0.34)  
IB 0.362 0.496 0.351 0.000 0.375 0.358 0.000 
 (0.38) (0.41) (0.38)  (0.39) (0.38)  
Leverage 0.475 0.577 0.471 0.000 0.440 0.489 0.000 
 (0.35) (0.58) (0.33)  (0.29) (0.37)  
Solvency 0.423 0.448 0.421 0.002 0.472 0.404 0.000 
 (0.53) (0.64) (0.53)  (0.35) (0.59)  
Profit 0.085 0.063 0.086 0.000 0.088 0.084 0.001 
 (0.19) (0.31) (0.18)  (0.17) (0.19)  
Size 3.917 3.531 3.939 0.000 4.026 3.875 0.000 
 (1.31) (1.21) (1.32)  (1.34) (1.30)  
Age 26.312 25.012 26.529 0.000 28.357 25.479 0.000 
 (22.39) (22.00) (22.44)  (22.65) (22.22)  
Group 0.192 0.069 0.212 0.000 0.213 0.183 0.000 
 (0.39) (0.25) (0.41)  (0.41) (0.38)  
Exchange 96.948 96.791 96.974 0.004 84.213 102.137 0.000 
 (15.51) (11.63) (11.49)  (9.20) (7.69)  
Observations 136,982 19,634 117,348  39,661 97,321  
 
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Fail is a dummy that 
equals 1 in a given year if the firm is recorded as failed in that year, and 0 otherwise. Crisis is a dummy 
representing the recent financial crisis. It takes value 1 in the years 2007-2009, and 0 otherwise. IB is defined as 
the ratio of interest payments to cash flow. Leverage is measured as the firm's total current liabilities to assets ratio. 
Solvency is defined as the ratio of the firm’s shareholders’ funds over its total assets. Profit is the ratio of the firm's 
profits before interest and tax to its total assets. Size is given by the log of the firm’s real assets measured in 
thousands of UK sterling. Age is defined as the difference between the present year and the firm’s date of 
incorporation. Group is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is part of a group (UK or foreign), and 0 otherwise. 
Exchange is the real effective exchange rate. Diff. is the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of means. 
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Table 2: Firm survival and the financial crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: All estimates were obtained using a proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Time and industry dummies were included in all models. Robust 
z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The F-test of equality 
for IB refers to the test of equality between IB*Crisis and IB*(1-Crisis). Also see notes to Table 1. *: 
significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%.  
 
  
Fail Baseline IB and Crisis IB*Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IB 0.614*** 0.614***  
 (8.77) (8.77)  
Crisis  0.910** 0.383 
  (2.15) (0.89) 
IB*Crisis   1.326*** 
   (8.10) 
IB*(1-Crisis)   0.484*** 
   (6.91) 
Solvency -0.420*** -0.420*** -0.378** 
 (-2.80) (-2.80) (-2.51) 
Leverage 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.517*** 
 (3.39) (3.39) (3.55) 
Profit 0.054 0.054 0.063 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.59) 
Size -0.341*** -0.341*** -0.342*** 
 (-12.00) (-12.00) (-12.10) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.31) 
Group -0.583*** -0.583*** -0.581*** 
 (-5.22) (-5.22) (-5.20) 
Exchange 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.154*** 
 (5.59) (5.59) (5.46) 
Constant -16.012*** -16.922*** -16.539*** 
 (-6.94) (-6.23) (-6.09) 
F-test of equality 
(p-value)for 
   
IB   0.000 
Observations 58,955 58,955 58,955 
Log-Likelihood -8,403 -8,403 -8,384 
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TABLE 3: Firm survival, financing constraints, and the crisis 
 
 
Notes: All estimates were obtained using a proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if 
the firm fails, and zero otherwise. Time and industry dummies were included in all models. Robust z-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Cons is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is 
financially constrained, and 0 otherwise. It is based, in turn, on BankDep(1/2), Young, and Non-exporter. BankDep1(2) is 
equal to 1 in a given year for firm i if its mix1(2) is in the top 50% of the distribution of the mix1(2)s of all firms 
operating in the same industry as firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Mix1 is the ratio of short-term debt to the sum of 
short-term debt and trade credit. Mix2 is the ratio of short-term debt to total current liabilities. Young is equal to 1 for firm 
i in year t if this firm’s age falls in the lower 50% of the age distribution of all firms operating in the same industry as 
firm i in that year, and 0 otherwise. Non-exporter is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has never reported a positive 
amount of exports throughout the sample period, and 0 otherwise. With reference to the F-test of equality, IB*Cons refers 
to the test of equality between IB*Cons*Crisis and IB*Cons*(1-Crisis). IB*(1-Cons) refers to the test of equality between 
IB*(1-Cons)*Crisis and IB*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis). IB*Crisis refers to the test of equality between IB*Cons*Crisis and 
IB*(1-Cons)*Crisis. Finally, IB*(1-Crisis) refers to the test of equality between IB*Cons*(1-Crisis) and IB*(1-Cons)*(1-
Crisis). Also see notes to Table 1.*: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%.  
 
Fail Cons= 
f(BankDep1) 
Cons= 
f(BankDep2) 
Cons= 
f(Young) 
Cons= 
f (Non-
Exporter) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IB*Cons* Crisis 1.667*** 1.583*** 1.325*** 1.349*** 
 (8.38) (7.93) (7.17) (7.48) 
IB*Cons*(1-Crisis) 0.702*** 0.676*** 0.458*** 0.484*** 
 (8.10) (7.87) (5.09) (6.23) 
IB*(1-Cons)* Crisis 1.037*** 1.145*** 1.322*** 1.298*** 
 (5.59) (6.33) (7.00) (6.88) 
IB*(1-Cons)*(1-Crisis) 0.238*** 0.346*** 0.509*** 0.484*** 
 (2.60) (3.97) (5.77) (5.22) 
Crisis 0.148 0.135 0.384 0.382 
 (0.34) (0.31) (0.89) (0.88) 
Solvency -0.460*** -0.389** -0.381** -0.379** 
 (-2.86) (-2.44) (-2.52) (-2.51) 
Leverage 0.688*** 0.615*** 0.517*** 0.517*** 
 (4.26) (3.86) (3.54) (3.54) 
Profit -0.027 -0.007 0.060 0.063 
 (-0.19) (-0.05) (0.55) (0.59) 
Size -0.323*** -0.324*** -0.342*** -0.341*** 
 (-10.98) (-11.14) (-12.07) (-11.95) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.06) (-0.19) (-0.43) (-0.30) 
Group -0.569*** -0.584*** -0.581*** -0.581*** 
 (-4.88) (-5.14) (-5.19) (-5.20) 
Exchange 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 
 (4.91) (4.94) (5.46) (5.46) 
Constant -15.292*** -15.356*** -16.529*** -16.539*** 
 (-5.56) (-5.59) (-5.60) (-5.60) 
F-test of equality (p-value)     
IB*Cons 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IB*(1-Cons) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
IB*Crisis 
IB*(1-Crisis) 
0.000 
0.000 
0.011 
0.000 
0.986 
0.648 
0.762 
0.997 
Observations 53,292 54,989 58,955 58,955 
Log-Likelihood -7,554 -7,866 -8,383 -8,384 
